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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an important role in the developing of developing 
countries. In particular in Africa, attracting more FDI can be especially useful in 
stimulating economic growth (Naudé et al., 2007). FDI can have a positive impact on 
growth by engaging domestic capital accumulation. Strong domestic investment 
performance is a sign of high returns to capital, which in turn will attract more foreign 
capital (Ndikumana et al, 2008). In addition, FDI bring with it employment, managerial 
skills and technology (Asiedu, 2002).  
This study intends to verify how developing countries in sub-Sahara Africa can 
influence the amount of foreign direct investment flowing towards their country with 
tax regimes. Do they use their tax regimes to attract more foreign direct investment? Or 
is a tax regime with confusing rules the cause of a low FDI rate? Maybe there is not at 
all a relation between a tax regime and foreign direct investment.   
The tax literature does not provide much information about the relation between tax 
regimes and FDI in developing countries, and even less about sub-Sahara Africa. The 
few related studies that I could find will be shortly summarized. C. Azémar and A. 
Delios have done a study about the investment of Japanese corporations in developing 
countries. They found in their study that the relation between corporate taxes and FDI is 
not obvious. They also provided a perspective on the situation of tax competition. The 
strong negative correlation they have observed between these FDI and  corporate tax 
rates is robust to the inclusion of the other control variables and is not an artefact 
generated by outliers. The results give some credit to the fear of the so-called race to the 
bottom, the tax competition between countries to attract foreign investors, with respect 
to corporate tax rates, and particularly for developing countries. Downward pressures on 
the taxation of capital are limited by the importance of public goods and public 
governance which increase the attractiveness of an host country and which are partly 
financed by fiscal receipts derived from corporate taxes (C.Azémar,et al, 2008.).  R. 
Bahl and R. Bird found in contrast to 30 years ago, most developing countries now seek 
to attract FDI to stimulate technological progress and economic growth the literature 
suggest that host-country tax rates matter, and that tax rate elasticises of FDI are 
roughly about -0,6. It appears to Bahl and Bird that home country rates are not very 
important. An obvious implication is that an investment-attracting strategy might be to 
provide preferential tax treatment for foreign versus domestic corporations, as China has 
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done for many years (Bahl et al., 2008). R. M. Bird and E. M. Zolt point out that tax 
policy is not just about economics. It also reflects such political factors as concerns 
about fairness and the desire of governments to stay in power. Tax policy choices are 
shaped by both economic structure and administrative capacity – factors that constrain 
the options available (Bird et al, 2008).  
 
The literature has left a range of questions. Therefore I formulated the following main 
question: 
 
In which way do the fastest emerging economies in sub-Sahara Africa use their tax 
regimes to attract foreign direct investment? 
 
With this question I will outline the differences between the emerging economies of 
sub-Sahara Africa. Why does one country attract a high FDI rate and another  country a 
low FDI rate? Does this depend on their reputation of are there other aspects, like 
infrastructure, important? The main concepts of this questions are, the fastest emerging 
economies in sub-Sahara Africa, tax regimes and foreign direct investment. 
  
The definition of the emerging economies of sub-Sahara Africa will be the definition of 
the IMF. In the September issue of  the IMF magazine finance & development, Nellor 
(2008) selected eight countries in sub-Sahara Africa that, because of their stability and 
economic potential, are emerging economies. The countries are Botswana, Zambia, 
Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana. Nellor selected these 
countries because the countries are comparable with the ASEAN countries (Myanmar, 
Brunei, Cambodia, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam) in 1980.  Since the 1980s the ASEAN countries have gone through a steady 
economic growth. In 2006 ASEAN countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam had GDP 
growth rates of more than 8 percent. Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand 
presently became lower or upper middle income countries (World Bank, 2006).  
Nellor found similarities between the ASEAN countries in 1980, when they had a 
economic take-off, and eight sub-Saharan African countries.  Nellor compared the 
ASEAN countries of 1980 with eight sub-Saharan African countries on GDP, inflation, 
financial debt, size of government, international reserves, debt, foreign direct 
investment and portfolio inflows (Table 1). The comparison is very promising for sub-
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Sahara Africa, especially because of the fact that the inflation  is lower in the eight 
emerging economies of sub-Sahara Africa, as is the debt. The international reserves, the 
portfolio inflows and the foreign direct investment are higher than the ASEAN countries. 
Furthermore the size of the government in the eight emerging economies of sub-Sahara 
Africa is half the size of the ASEAN countries in 1980(Table 1).  The size of the 
government can be favourable as it leads to public sector growth. Because there is a lot 
of corruption in African countries (see chapter 5) a big public sector is probably a 
negative aspect.  
 
 
Nellor states that the emerging economies of sub-Sahara Africa have high scores on 
growth, private-sector led growth and investible markets (Nellor, 2008). Although some 
of the countries had negative terms of trade they managed to have a solid growth (Graph 
1). This depends largely on policy frameworks that helped the markets adjust towards 
higher import prices. Notably, Zambia fails to grow during adversity.  
 
 
Table 1: Measuring up, Nellor (2008) 
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Graph 1: Growing during adversity (Nellor, 2008) 
Note: Oil-exporting countries, fragile states, Zimbabwe and South-Africa are excluded from the graph 
 
Private led growth has grown in the whole of sub-Sahara Africa (Graph 2). But the total 
portfolio inflows show that especially the emerging sub-Sahara African countries attract 
private investment (Graph 3). Notably Mozambique is not on Graph 3.  South-Africa 
receives 87,6 percent of the total portfolio inflows.  Uganda is second with 3,3 percent 
of the total portfolio inflows in sub-Sahara Africa and Ghana third with 3,2 percent of 
the total portfolio inflows in sub-Sahara Africa (IMF, 2008).  
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Figuur 1Graph 2: Private capital inflows (IMF, 2008) 
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Graph 3: Total Portfolio inflows (IMF, 2008) 
 
Graph 4 shows the raking of the Doing Business indicator of 2007. The Doing Business 
indicator indicates the ease of doing business in a country. Although some emerging 
countries of sub-Sahara Africa have a lower ranking in the Doing Business indicator of 
2007 most of the emerging sub-Sahara Africa countries, such as Botswana, Kenya and 
Ghana are at the top of the Doing Business indicator.  
 
 
Graph 4: Ranking of Doing Business 2007 sub-Sahara Africa (World Bank, 2008) 
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Tax regimes can be an important trigger for foreign investors. Therefore capital is often 
very mobile between countries. In general, countries that attempt to impose 
substantially heavier corporate or capital gain taxes often experience outflows of 
domestic savings to countries employing lower tax rates on capital. This movement of 
capital is quite distinct from the type of capital flight from developing to developed 
countries often observed in countries experiencing serve domestic political turmoil or 
exchange-rate uncertainties (Perkens et al., 2006). There is a heavy competition 
between countries to attract foreign direct investment. But the impact of the capital 
flight on developing countries is more important than the impact on developed countries 
due their relative small economies. This makes it interesting for developing countries to 
study how they can control foreign investors. Capital flight concerns the direct impact 
of taxes, the indirect impact of taxes will be described next.  
 
In this research I will use the definition of the IMF for FDI, because their definition is 
internationally accepted. Foreign direct investment is international investment that 
reflects the objective of  a resident in one economy (the direct investor) obtaining a 
lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another country (the direct investment 
enterprise). A direct investment relationship is established when the direct investor has 
acquired 10 percent of more of the ordinary shares of voting power of an enterprise 
abroad. FDI does not only affects the direct investor and the direct investment enterprise 
but all subsequent capital transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises 
resident in different countries. (IMF, 2003) 
 
1.1 Study’s questions  
To answer the main question, this research will have three study questions. The 
questions are: 
• What is the general tax policy for foreign investors, and for the different 
sectors and in which way do corporations react on tax adjustments? 
• What is the reputation of the tax regime? 
• What are the other aspects of attracting foreign direct investment? 
These questions have each indicators. The indicators will provide a systematic 
framework which will be used to answer the main question. When I have  answered the 
study questions, I will know the characterizes of tax regimes in emerging Africa. Then it 
is possible to compare the different countries and answer the main question. 
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1.2 Theoretical framework 
This research is a multiple case study with eight cases. The cases will be selected on 
predicted similar results (Yin, 2003). Thus, the different cases have literal replications 
and the same indicators are used in every case. Because the case studies are based on 
data this is an embedded case study. The cases are the emerging economies of sub-
Sahara Africa that are selected by the IMF on three criteria: growth, private-sector led 
growth and investible markets (Nellor, 2008). Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana are emerging economies in the definition of the 
IMF. The case studies can verify in which way emerging economies stimulate foreign 
direct investment with their tax regime.  
 
First this study will describe the tax regimes of the eight cases. The necessary 
information will be provided by either Price Waterhouse Coopers or UNCTAD. The 
online tax summary database of Price Waterhouse Cooper does not have a description 
of all the tax regimes of the eight cases. Luckily, UNCTAD has written Investment 
Policy Reviews with descriptions of tax regimes of the cases that are not included on the 
Price Waterhouse Coopers database. To make the tax regimes more comparable the 
main characteristics of the tax regimes will be compared in a table. 
 
Second the impact of the corporate tax rate on the foreign investment will be explored. 
First the foreign investment flows between 1990-2000 and 2004-2008 will be analyzed. 
The total foreign investment flows and the growth of the total foreign investment will be 
part of the analysis. The necessary data will be provided by UNCTAD and Price 
Waterhouse Coopers. Thereafter graphs will show whether the corporate tax rate 
changes between 1995-2002 have affected the foreign investment flows between 1995-
2002.   The necessary data will be provided by the World Tax Database of the 
University of Michigan. This will verify whether foreign investors react on corporate 
tax rate changes and whether FDI can result in a tax completion in sub-Sahara Africa.  
 
Third, next to the tax regime there can be many other factors that influence FDI. 
Therefore this study verifies what the impact of the trust of investors, the functioning of 
the government, the infrastructure, the share of natural resources in the total export and 
the rigidity of employment is on FDI. The relations will be explored with the use of 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient. Pearson ‘s correlation coefficient will be used because 
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it is widely used in the academic world and can be used with different scales. Pearson ‘s 
correlation coefficient calculates a linear dependence between two variables. The 
calculations will be done with the use of SPSS. The dependent variable is the total 
foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP, which is standard for research on FDI in 
the literature. The table 2 shows that the skewness of the dependent variable is 0,373. A 
skewness between -1 and 1 is considered as acceptable.  
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness  
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error 
Total foreign investment as a 
percentage of the GDP  
8 2,34 6,46 4,0775 1,52131 ,373 ,752
Valid N (listwise) 8       
 
The variable will be compared with either the average of the OECD and sub-Sahara 
Africa, and if the average is not available with two of the biggest economies of the 
OECD (United States and Germany) and the biggest economy of sub-Sahara Africa 
(South-Africa).  
 
Trust of investors  
To measure the impact of the trust of investors on FDI I will use three indicators, the 
foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation, the insurance 
ceilings for investment in a country and the Investor Protection Index.  
The insurance ceiling of a country is the maximum investment that can be insured 
without the guarantee from a bank. The insurance company Ducroire Delcredere can 
cover export transactions financed by both short-term credits and medium/long term 
credits against political and commercial risks on open account terms, i.e. without a bank 
guarantee being required.  In conformity with the OECD Arrangement, the maximum  
reimbursement period for medium- and long-term transactions with this country has 
been set at 10 years. Ducroire Delcredere insures investments in this country against, 
war risk, the risk of expropriation and government action and the transfer risk regarding 
payment of dividends or repatriation of capital. Each application is decided case by case 
on the basis of a detailed analysis (Ducroire Delcredere, 2009).  
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The Investor Protection Index is an index that is developed by S. Djankov, R. La Porta, 
F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Schleifer (Djankov et al., 2008). The index measures the 
strength of minority shareholders against directors misuse of corporate assets for 
personal gain. The Investor Protection Index is based on three indexes: the disclosure 
index, the director liability index and the shareholder suits index. The disclosure index 
measures the transparency of the party-related transactions, the director liability index 
measures the liability of self-dealing, the shareholder suits index measures the 
shareholders ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct. In this research I use a 
survey of the World Bank Group and the International Finance Centre based on the 
methodology of Djankov (Djankov et al,2008). 
The last indicator is total foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation. Gross Fixed Capital Formation as defined by the European System of 
Accounts (ESA) consists of resident producers' acquisitions, less disposals, of fixed 
assets during a given period plus certain additions to the value of non-produced assets 
realized by the productive activity of producer or institutional units (ESA, 2001). Thus 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation is a indicator of  long term business activity in a country. 
The higher the percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation is in the total foreign 
investment, the more corporations are connected with a country through fixed assets. 
The presence of fixed assets suggests a long term activity in a country. A corporation 
would not invest in fixed assets if the corporations would want to leave the corporation 
within a few years. The necessary data will be provided by UNCTAD and Price 
Waterhouse Coopers. 
 
The functioning of the government 
For the functioning of the government we will use four indicators, the number of days it 
takes to start a new business, the number of procedures it takes to start a new business 
and the number of days until a contract is enforced. The indicator on enforcing contracts 
which measures the efficiency of the judicial system in resolving a commercial dispute 
and the methodology is developed by S. Djankov, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and 
A. Schleifer (Djankov et al., 2008). The data are built by following the step-by-step 
evolution of a commercial sale dispute before local courts. The data are collected 
through study of the codes of civil procedure and other court regulations as well as 
surveys completed by local litigation lawyers by the World Bank Group, International 
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Finance Centre and Palgrave Macmillian (World Bank Group e.a, 2009).  The necessary 
data will be provided by the Doing Business survey.  
 
Infrastructure 
The impact of the infrastructure on FDI will be measure by one indicator. The number 
of airports per 100.000 inhabitants will indicate the quality of the infrastructure. Other 
possible indicators as paved roads, railways and waterways are related to the number of 
airports per 100.000 inhabitants or are quite static.  
 
The share of natural resources in the total export 
The share of natural resources of the total export clarifies how much a country depends 
on the export of natural resources. The export of natural resources can be a very 
important aspect for foreign investors to invest in a country. The natural resources that 
have  more than  one percent of the total export will be included in the research. The 
necessary data will be found in the database of the International Finance Centre.   
 
The rigidity of employment 
The rigidity of employment index  methodology is developed by J.C. Botero S. Djankov, 
R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Schleifer (Botero et al, 2004) The rigidity of 
hours index has five components: whether night work is unrestricted, whether weekend 
work is unrestricted, whether the work week can consist of 5,5 days, whether the 
workweek can extend to fifty hours or more for two months a year to respond to a 
seasonal increase in production and whether paid annual vacation is twenty-one 
working days or fewer.  
The difficulty of firing index has eight components: whether redundancy is disallowed 
as a basis for terminating workers, whether the employer needs to notify a third party to 
terminate one redundant worker, whether the employer needs to notify a third party to 
terminate a group of twenty-five workers, whether the employer needs approval from a 
third party to terminate one redundant worker, wheter the employer needs approval 
from a third party to terminate a group of 25 redundant workers, whether the law 
requires the employer to reassign or retrain a worker before making the worker 
redundant, whether priority rules apply for redundancies and whether priority rules 
apply for reemployment (Botero et al, 2004).   
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1.3 Validity and reliability  
There are three kinds of validity, construct validity (a sufficiently operational set of 
measure), internal validity (no illusionary relation) and external validity (the findings 
can be generalized) (Yin, 2003). This research has a construct validity because of the 
multiple sources of evidence. A broad range of institutions will be used to attract data. 
Private enterprises as Price Waterhouse Coopers and Ducroire Delcredere will provide 
data but institutions as the World Bank, IMF and the UN will provide data too.  The 
only problem is that companies can  make arrangements with governments about 
corporate tax rates and other agreements that are not known by this institutions. But it is 
not in the range of this study to explore this arrangements. Though the internal validity 
is ensured enough due the study of other factors that can attract foreign investors such 
as the trust of investors, the functioning of the government, the infrastructure, the share 
of natural resources in the total export and the rigidity of employment. Thus an 
illusionary relation will be avoided. Survey research relies on statistical generalization, 
whereas case studies rely on analytical generalization (Yin, 2003). The outcomes of this 
research can only be generalized to emerging economies in Africa. Therefore I will 
study eight emerging economies in Africa. This will provide for the external validity.  
There are eight cases thus it is possible that not all the data will be available for all the 
cases. Because I use different indicators and different institutions that provided the data 
the research will be reliable.  The theoretical framework will function as a guideline for 
the research. I will describe every step in the research elaborate making sure that other 
researches can use this research.  
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Chapter 2: Corporate tax policy 
 
This chapter describes the corporate tax regime of the eight emerging economies of sub-
Sahara Africa. Of each case there will be a description of the corporate tax rates and 
whether there are differences between the primary, secondary and tertiary sector. Next 
to the corporate tax rates the incentives, relevant deductions for foreign investors and 
relevant other taxes for foreign investors will be described.  Table 3 shows the corporate 
tax rates in Australia and Canada. Both Australia and Canada export a large amount of 
minerals and are known as developed countries. The height of the corporate tax rates of 
both countries will be compared with the emerging sub-Sahara African countries to 
compare possible differences between developing countries and developed countries.  
Table 3: Corporate tax rates in Australia and Canada
Corporate tax 
rates in Australia
Corporate tax 
rates in Canada 
Primary sector  30 28
Secundary sector*  30 28
Tertairy sector  30 28
Capital gains  ‐  ‐ 
other**  ‐  14
*for manufacturing and processing the corporate tax rate is 19,5 percent 
**Provincal corporate tax rate     
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers 2009     
 
For foreign investors it is important to know whether there are any tax treaties. Tax 
treaties are treaties between countries to avoid double taxation.  At the end of the 
chapter the tax regimes will be compared on different corporate tax rates for certain 
sectors, the main goal of the tax regime, the existence of Export-Processing Zones 
(EPZs), special policies on fixed assets, special policies on the training of employees 
and R&D, and the total number of Double Tax Treaties (DTTs) that are signed with 
various countries 
  
2.1 Tax policy in Botswana 
In the following paragraph the tax regime of Botswana will be described. Table 4 shows 
the corporate tax rates in Zambia. The primary and the tertiary sector have both a 
corporate tax rate of 15%. The secondary sector has a corporate tax rate of only 5%. The 
economy of Botswana depends largely on the diamond industry, currently diamond 
mining accounts for more than one-third of GDP and for 70-80% of export earnings 
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(CIA, 2009) To make the economy more diverse Botswana tries to attract investors in 
the secondary sector with low corporate tax rates (Conteh, 2008).  
Table 4: corporate tax rates in Botswana  Corporate tax rates  Comments 
Primary sector  15   
Secundary sector  5   
Tertairy sector  15   
Capital gains   ‐    
other  10 additional company tax 
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers 2009       
  
Next to the corporate tax rate there is an additional company tax too. This additional 
company tax is 10% of the total company income. Botswana does not have a capital 
gains tax. 
The government can encourage investment in specific business development projects 
with tax reliefs on capital and gains if the government thinks the project is beneficial for 
Botswana (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009).  
There are several deductions for non-mining corporations for equipment, machinery and 
buildings. Annual taxation allowances for expenditure incurred on machinery and 
equipment can be claimed up to 100 percent. A initial allowance of 25 percent of cost is 
granted on certain industrial buildings. All industrial and commercial building are 
granted a 2,5 percent annual allowance based on cost or, in the case of an industrial 
building on which an initial allowance has been claimed, the original cost less the initial 
allowance. A deduction of 200 percent of the cost of approved training expenditure is 
allowed. For diamond mining, corporations are usually taxed in an agreement with the 
government of Botswana (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009).  
Botswana has taxation treaties with Russia, India, Namibia, South-Africa, the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, France and the Seychelles. 
The corporate tax rate of Botswana plus the additional company tax is 25 percent. The 
corporate tax rate in Australia and Canada are both higher. The difference with 
Australia (30 percent) is not so big, but the difference between the Canadian corporate 
tax rate plus the provincial tax rate  (28 percent plus 14 percent) and  the corporate tax 
rate  is a striking difference. 
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2.2 Tax policy in Zambia 
In the following paragraph the corporate tax regime of Zambia will be described. The 
general corporate tax rate in Zambia is 35 percent (Table 5), although there are a lot of 
incentives.  
Table 5: Corporate tax rates in Zambia  Corporate tax rates  
Primary sector*  35
Secundary sector  35
Tertairy sector  35
Capital gains   ‐ 
other   ‐ 
*mining sector 25%, agricultural sector 10% 
Source: UNCTAD 2006 
 
For the mining and agricultural sector the government has reduced the corporate tax rate. 
For agricultural companies the corporate tax rate is 15 percent. There is a incentive for 
mining companies too, but the ZCCM holding needs to maintain a share of stocks in the 
mining companies to use the incentive. The ZCCM holding possess stocks of all the 
main Zambian mining companies. The ZCCM related corporations have to pay 25 
percent tax, mining companies that are not a part of the ZCCM holding have to pay the 
moderate tax rate of 35 percent. 
Companies that are listed on the Lusaka Stock Exchange have to pay 33 percent tax. 
The tax rate was first 30 percent, but not many companies made use of this incentive 
thus the tax was raised to 33 percent. Commercial banks are taxed 45 percent of their 
profits above 250 million Kwacha ($83.500). (UNCTAD, 2006) 
 
In 2006 the ZDA (Zambian Development Agency) announced new incentives for 
investors. Investments above $500.000 that are licensed by the ZDA and are operating 
within a sector that is selected by the ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry benefit 
from this incentives. The incentives contain for  the first five years of operation that 
corporate tax should be calculated on 50 percent of profits, that dividends should be 
exempt from tax and that capital expenditure on the improvement or upgrading of 
infrastructure should qualify for an improvement allowance of 100 percent. In addition, 
imported machinery and equipment is exempt from customs duty (UNCTAD, 2006).  
The ZDA implements Multi-Facility Economic Zones (MFEZs) too (UNCTAD, 2006). 
Unlike EPZs, which were never established in Zambia, the proposed MFEZs will not 
enjoy customs extra-territoriality, but function like industrial parks with good quality 
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facilities, infrastructure and incentives. Zone developers will be granted a ten-year tax 
exemption on profits and dividends, and relief from import duty on equipment. 
Investors within an MFEZ will receive a tapered relief from profits tax over ten years, a 
five-year exemption from dividends tax and exemption from import duties on raw 
materials, intermediate and capital goods. The profits and dividend taxes exemption 
period will begin from the first year that profits are earned. Additional incentives cover 
expenditure on export promotion, human resource development, research and 
development, recreational facilities for staff, and the fight against HIV/Aids, 
tuberculosis and malaria. A 100 percent tax allowance will apply on infrastructure 
improvement. Investments in these zones have non-fiscal and fiscal profits.  
Zambia has several DTTs (DTT). Zambia signed DTTs with: Botswana, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Netherlands, 
Norway, Romania, South-Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Uganda, United 
Kingdom and the United States (UNCTAD, 2006). The total amount of 21 DTTs is, 
compared to the region, quite impressive. 
The corporate tax regime of Zambia is focused on attracting investments in the mining 
and agricultural sector. Also it is fiscally attractive to be enlisted on the Lusaka Stock 
Exchange as a corporation. Although not many corporations make use of this incentive.  
The standard corporate tax rate of Zambia is 32 percent, for the primary sector the 
corporate tax rate is 10 percent. The corporate tax rate of Australia is slightly lower (30 
percent). The Canadian corporate tax rate plus the provincial corporate tax rate (28 
percent plus 14 percent) is much higher. 
 
2.3 Tax policy of Mozambique 
The corporate tax rate of Mozambique is set on 32 percent (table 6). Except for income 
arising from agriculture and cattle breeding activities, which is subject to a reduced rate 
of 10 percent up to 2010 (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2009). Capital gains are considered 
as profit. Therefore the corporate tax rate of 32 percent counts on capital gains too. 
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Table 6: corporate tax rates in 
Mozambique  Corporate tax rates 
Primary sector  10
Secundary sector  32
Tertairy sector  32
Capital gains  32
other   ‐ 
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers 2009   
 
For investments in fixed assets there is a tax reduction of five percent of the total 
foreign investment realised for five years. This tax reduction shall be deductible from 
the amount of the total corporate tax. The tax reduction shall not apply when the 
investment in tangible fixed assets is in respect of the construction, acquisition, 
restoration or extension of buildings, passenger vehicles, furnishings and articles of 
comfort and decoration, leisure equipment, advanced technology and other assets not 
directly associated with the production activity carried out by the enterprise (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, 2009). 
New immovable assets used for corporate activities can be depreciated twice the normal 
rate. This incentive is also granted for rehabilitated assets, machinery and equipment 
used in the agricultural sector. (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009).  
During the first 5 years form date of commencement of activity is the amount invested 
in specialized equipment considered as advanced technology shall,  benefit from a 
deduction from taxable income for purposes of calculating the corporate income tax up 
to a maximum of 15 percent of taxable income. The professional training of 
Mozambican workers shall, up to a maximum amount of 5 percent of the taxable 
income, be deductible from taxable income for the purposes of calculating the 
Corporate Income tax during the first 5 years from the date of commencement of 
activity. There are also deductions for expenditures in the construction and 
rehabilitation of roads, railways, airports, telecommunications, water supply, electric 
energy and other works of public utility. The deduction for corporations active in the 
city of Maputo is 120 percent of the value of expenditure. Corporations active in the rest 
of the provinces have a deduction of 150 percent of the value of expenditure. (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, 2009).  
Mozambique has signed DTTs with four countries. The countries are: Portugal, 
Mauritius, Italy and Dubai (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009).  
Tax regimes in emerging Africa  Michiel Stapper 
21 
 
Overall, the most deductions and incentives created in the Mozambican tax policy are 
related to (public) infrastructure, knowledge and the agricultural sector. 
The corporate tax rate of Australia is slightly lower (30 percent) except for the primary 
sector which is much lower. The Canadian corporate tax rate plus the provincial 
corporate tax rate (28 percent plus 14 percent) is much higher. 
 
2.4 Tax policy in Kenya 
The corporate tax rate in Kenya is 37,5 percent, this rate counts for all the sectors (table 
7). Tax on capital gains is suspended since 1985 (UNCTAD, 2005). According to 
UNCTAD the overall tax regime in Kenya is efficient and fair relative to other 
developing countries. Kenya compares favorably with other countries in the region and 
elsewhere in terms of revenue collection as a percent of GDP (UNCTAD, 2005).  
Table 7: Corporate tax rates in Kenya  Corporate tax rates 
Primary sector  37,5 
Secundary sector  37,5 
Tertairy sector  37,5 
Capital gains   ‐ 
other*   ‐ 
*EPZs: first 10 years 0%, next ten years 25% thereafter 30% 
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers 2009   
 
The incentives that the Kenyan government uses are for resident corporations, EPZs and 
companies listed on the Nairobi stock exchange. Resident corporations have a reduced 
corporate tax rate of 30 percent. In EPZs there is a exemption of tax for  the first ten 
years. After ten years there is a corporate tax rate of 25 percent and the standard rate 
thereafter. Corporations that are listed at the Nairobi stock exchange have an incentive 
too. Newly enlisted corporations are taxed at either 25 percent or 27 percent for five 
years from the year of listing if they float a minimum of 30 percent or 20 percent of 
their capital, respectively (UNCTAD, 2005).  
The manufacturing, secondary, sector also benefits from an ‘investment deduction’ for 
expenditure on buildings and other capital spending, while hotels benefit from the 
investment deduction on buildings only. The investment deduction  is an accelerated 
rate of depreciation in the first year. As of 2004 and until 2008, the investment 
deduction allowed a 100 percent rate of depreciation in the first year. This rate has 
fluctuated widely in the past, sometimes according to the region in which the investment 
takes place (UNCTAD, 2005).  
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Kenya has signed eight DTTs, including the major sources of FDI towards Kenya: 
United Kingdom, Canada and Germany. The other countries are: Denmark, India, 
Norway, Sweden and Zambia. Thus the only African country that has signed a double 
taxation treaty with Kenya is Zambia. Since 1999 there are talks with the East African 
Community members to sign a treaty. Although the East African Community is 
ambitious, with creating a common market in East Africa, to date they have not ratified 
a double taxation treaty.  
Compared with the corporate tax rate of Australia (30 percent) is the corporate tax rate 
of  Kenya quite high. Still the Kenyan tax rate is lower than the Canadian corporate tax 
rate plus the provincial tax rate  (28 percent plus 14 percent). 
 
2.5 Tax policy in Tanzania 
The corporate tax rate in Tanzania is set on 30 percent of the corporate income (table 8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For agricultural, mining, tourism and manufacturing companies there are incentives.  
Expenditure on plant machinery is generally written off on a reducing balance basis at 
rates of 37,5 percent, 25 percent or 12,5 percent depending on the category of the asset. 
Specified plant and machinery for manufacturing, fish farming and tourist hotels 
benefits from a 50 percent allowance in the first year, with the normal rates applying to 
the remaining balance in subsequent years. There is an immediate write-off of 
expenditure on plant and machinery used in agriculture. Expenditure on buildings 
qualifies for a depreciation allowance of 5 percent straight-line. For intangible assets, 
the write off is over the useful life of the asset. Agricultural businesses also benefit from 
the immediate write off of plant, machinery and agricultural improvement expenditure. 
Buildings, structures, dams, water reservoirs, fences and similar works of a permanent 
nature used in agriculture, livestock or fish farming are written off on a straight-line 
basis over 5 years. Mining companies are entitled to a 100 percent capital deduction in 
respect of capital expenditure on exploration and development (Price Waterhouse 
Table 8: Corporate tax rates in Tanzania  Corporate tax rates 
Primary sector  30
Secundary sector  30
Tertairy sector  30
Capital gains   ‐ 
other   ‐ 
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers 2009   
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Coopers, 2009). Tanzania has EPZs on the mainland and special economic zones on 
Zanzibar. The EPZs on the mainland are not developed by the government. The private 
sector has to develop the zones; the government provides land and attractive legislation. 
EPZ status is to be given to individual factories with the potential to export 80 percent 
or more of their production. The special economic zones on Zanzibar included a 10 year 
tax holiday, no withholding tax on dividends, interest and any other income accrued 
from business transactions during the tax holiday period, free repatriation of dividends 
after taxation, 25 percent investment allowance and 100 percent ownership retention, 
several exemptions from customs and import duties used for manufacturing and export 
purposes and a generous term of government land lease for 49 years, which can be 
extended to 98 years (UNCTAD, 2002). DTTs are in force with Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, India, Italy, Norway, South-Africa, Sweden and Zambia. Certain other DTTs 
(including an East African double tax treaty with Kenya and Uganda) have been signed 
but not yet ratified (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009). 
The Tanzanian corporate tax rate is the same as the Australian corporate tax rate (30 
percent) and lower than the Canadian corporate tax rate plus the provincial tax rate  (28 
percent plus 14 percent). 
 
2.6 Tax policy in Uganda 
The corporate tax rate in Uganda is 30 percent (table 9). 
 
Table 9: Corporate tax rates in Uganda  Corporate tax rates 
Primary sector*  30
Secundary sector  30
Tertairy sector  30
Capital gains   ‐ 
other   ‐ 
*The mining industry has a calculated 
tax rate 
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers 2009   
 
Uganda has a special corporate tax rate for the mining sector. The mining industry has a 
calculated tax rate. The calculation for the corporate tax rate is (70-1500/X) where x is 
the ratio of the company’s chargeable income to the gross revenue for the year. 
However the minimum tax rate is 25 percent and the maximum tax rate is 45 percent 
(Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009)  
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Uganda has general incentives too. There is a tax holiday for ten years for exporters of 
finished consumer and capital goods. The tax payer should export at least 80% of his 
products (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009). Initial allowances are available for 
companies that put a qualifying item of plant and machinery into use for the first time in 
a year of income. If a qualifying asset is placed in service outside specified locations, it 
is entitled to capital allowances of up to 75% of the cost base of the asset. If it is within 
the specified areas then it attracts an initial allowance of 50% of the cost base of the 
asset. Initial allowances of 20% of the cost base of a building are available for new 
industrial buildings brought into service for the first time (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 
2009). Other incentives include a 25 percent allowance on start up costs, 100 percent 
allowance for scientific research expenditure, training expenditure and mineral 
exploration expenditure. Industrial building allowances and farm works allowances are 
also available for investments in specific sectors (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009).  
Uganda has DTTs with Denmark, East Africa (Kenya and Tanzania), India, Italy, 
Mauritius, the Netherlands, Norway, South-Africa and the United Kingdom (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, 2009).   
The Ugandan corporate tax rate is the same as the Australian corporate tax rate (30 
percent) and lower than the Canadian corporate tax rate plus the provincial tax rate  (28 
percent plus 14 percent). 
 
2.7 Tax policy in Nigeria 
Nigeria is a country with a lot of incentives and deductions. The regular corporate tax 
rate is 32 percent, with a small minimum tax applicable four years after business start-
up. This minimum tax is payable by a company where the total assessable profits from 
all sources results in a loss or no tax being payable or tax payable that is less than the 
minimum tax. Where turnover is NGN 500.000 or less the minimum tax is the highest 
of 0.5 percent of gross profits, or 0,5 percent of net assets, or 0,25 percent of paid-up 
capital or 0,25 percent of turnover. Where turnover is higher than NGN 500.000 an 
additional tax is payable, calculated at the rate of 0,125 percent of turnover exceeding 
NGN 500.000. Agricultural and agro-allied companies, companies with at least 25 
percent foreign equity and any company in the first four years of commencement of 
business are not required to pay the minimum tax (Deloitte, 2009). An unusual excess 
profits tax also applies. Excess profits tax is payable either as 15 percent of the shortfall 
between actual taxable income and a flat amount of $40.000 or at 15 percent of a 
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weighted average concept of capital employed. The excess profits tax is effectively a 
second-tier minimum tax (when applied to the flat amount) but without the grace period 
and exemptions available on the minimum tax. See table 10.  
Table 10: Corporate tax rates in Nigeria  Corporate tax rates 
Primary sector  32 
Secundary sector  32 
Tertairy sector  32 
Capital gains   ‐ 
other   ‐ 
     
Source: UNCTAD 2008    
 
In Nigeria, corporations have several annual capital allowances (including 10 percent on 
buildings, 25 percent on plant, 20 percent on furniture and fittings) supplemented in 
many cases by substantial initial year allowances (including 50 percent on plants, 15 
percent on buildings and motor vehicles). Agricultural, mining and public transportation 
assets have especially favourable initial year allowances. Replacement plant and 
machinery have an initial allowance of 95 percent. However, the deduction of capital 
allowances is capped at two thirds of annual assessable profits, except in agriculture and 
agro processing, and the total allowance is limited to 95 percent of asset cost (UNCTAD, 
2008).  
Next to the capital allowances there are three types of incentives in Nigeria. First is the 
so-called pioneer industry incentive. Designated ‘pioneer’ industries may qualify for a 
five-year profits and dividends tax holiday. There are currently 69 designated types of 
pioneer industries in agriculture, agro-processing, mining, quarrying, manufacturing, 
tourism, property development and utilities. Minimum capital invested to qualify is 
about $2.500,- for nationally-owned companies and about $40.000 for foreign-owned 
companies. Despite the generosity of this scheme, there appears to have modest take-up 
(UNCTAD, 2008). 
Second there are five sectoral incentives. The sector with incentives are: agriculture, 
agro-processing, mining, manufacturing and services. Mining has an own incentive of a 
three years tax holiday. The manufacturing sector has its own incentives too. 
Manufacturing is entitled to rapid depreciation allowances, although these are somewhat 
vitiated by the cap on aggregate capital allowances and the four-year limit on loss carry 
forward. Also, manufacturing plant and machinery receives a 10 percent investment 
allowance. (UNCTAD, 2008) 
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Third there are outcomes incentives which includes EPZs. The amount invested  in the 
EPZs must be at least $500.000. The income tax relief is made proportionate to the 
amount of exports in relation to total turnover. A separate scheme permits 
manufacturers that export at least 50 percent of output to qualify for pioneer status. It is 
also possible for exporters to qualify for financial assistance for export marketing 
expenses (the Export Development Fund), for expansion and export diversification (the 
Export Expansion Grant Fund) and to compensate for higher production costs arising 
from poor infrastructure or factors beyond the exporters control (the Export Adjustment 
Scheme Fund). Tax law provides that profits earned from goods exports may, if 
reinvested, be exempt indefinitely from income tax. However, it seems that this scheme 
does not operate in practice due to the difficulties of monitoring the reinvestment 
conditions. Dividends received from wholly export-oriented businesses are also exempt 
from tax (UNCTAD, 2008). Next to the EPZs Nigeria has four more outcomes 
incentives. The first concerns R&D. Nigeria has several fiscal incentives to encourage 
R&D by firms. The general provisions are that, for any business, up to 10 percent of 
profits set aside as a reserve for R&D qualify as allowable expense (UNCTAD, 2008). 
Then there is a incentive for local sourcing. Local manufacturers of spare parts, tools, 
equipment supplied to other local businesses or exported can obtain a 25 percent 
investment tax credit on their capital expenditure. A company buying locally 
manufactured plant, machinery and equipment is entitled to a 15 percent investment tax 
credit (UNCTAD, 2008). Small and middle enterprises (SMEs) are exempt from 
minimum tax, pay a lower profits tax rate of 20 percent in the first five years in several 
sectors, and dividends are exempt from tax. For outward investment dividends from 
Nigerian affiliates abroad are exempt from tax in Nigeria if repatriated to official 
domiciliary accounts (UNCTAD, 2009) 
Nigeria has DTTs with Belgium, Canada, France, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. 
Agreements with China, South Africa and Sweden are awaiting ratification (UNCTAD, 
2009).  
The Australian tax rate(30 percent) is slightly lower than the corporate tax rate of 
Nigeria The corporate tax rate of Canada (28 percent plus a provincial tax rate of 14 
percent) is higher than the corporate tax rate of Nigeria. 
 
 
 
Tax regimes in emerging Africa  Michiel Stapper 
27 
 
 
2.8 Tax policy in Ghana 
The corporate tax rate in Ghana is 25 percent for companies that are not listed on the 
Ghana Stock Exchange and 22 percent for companies listed on the Ghana Stock 
Exchange (Table 11). 
 
Table 11: Corporate tax rates in Ghana  Corporate tax rate*** 
Primary sector*‘***  25
Secundary sector***  25
Tertairy sector*’***  25
Capital gains**   5
other   ‐ 
*Companies engaged in non‐traditional export and rural banking (8%) after 10 years, bank lenders to the agricultural and 
leasing sectors (20%), and companies in the hotel industry (25%) 
**Exceptions: gains on stocks/shares form the GSE and because of and activities concerned reforms 
***Companies enlisted on the Ghana Stock Exchange have a corporate tax rate of 22 percent 
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers 2009   
 
Ghana stimulates investment in several sectors. After ten years applies for non-
traditional export and rural banking companies, a corporate tax rate of 8 percent. For 
bank lenders to the agricultural and leasing sectors counts a corporate tax rate of 20 
percent. The hotel industry applies for a corporate tax rate of 25 percent. A capital gains 
in excess of GH¢ 50 (€24,20) are subject to a tax of 5 percent, however companies 
enlisted on the Ghana Stock Exchange are exempt (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009).  
To encourage investment in Ghana there are several incentives. Under the Ghana 
Investments Promotion Centre Act 1994, the sectors of agriculture, manufacturing 
industries engaged in export trade or using predominantly local raw materials or 
producing agricultural equipment, and so on, construction and building industries, 
mining and tourism have incentives. These incentives include exemption from customs 
import duties on plant and machinery, reduced corporate income tax rates, more 
favourable investment and capital allowances on plant and machinery, reduction in the 
actual corporate income tax payable, where appropriate, retention of foreign exchange 
earnings where necessary, guaranteed free transfer of dividends or net profits, foreign 
capital, loan servicing and fees and charges in respect of technology transfer and 
guarantees against expropriation by the government (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009). 
A venture capital tax incentive is in play too. This incentive includes relief from stamp 
duty in each year on subscriptions for new equity shares in venture capital funds, full 
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tax exemption from corporate income tax, dividend tax and capital gains tax for five 
years, losses from disposal of shares during the tax exempt period may be carried 
forward to the post-exempt period up to five years, and financial institutions which 
invest in venture capital subsidiaries will receive a chargeable income tax deduction 
equal to 100 percent of their investment (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009).  
Ghana has several EPZs, the so-called Free Trade Zones (FTZs). The FTZs provides 
several incentives, including zero percent income tax for 10 years and a guarantee that 
income tax thereafter shall not exceed 8 percent, total exemptions from payment of 
withholding tax from dividends arising out of investments in FTZs, relief from double 
taxation for foreign investors and employees, no import licensing requirements, 100 
percent foreign ownership is allowed and no restrictions on repatriation of profits. 
Companies that export 70 percent of their production can obtain free zones status even 
if established outside the zone.(UNCTAD, 2003). 
Ghana has DTTs with the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Gambia, Sierra Leone, 
Nigeria and Sweden. The double tax treaty with France is not yet ratified (Ministry of 
Finance, 2009; Ghana Stock Exchange, 2000). 
The corporate tax rate of Ghana is lower than Australia (30 percent) and Canada (28 
percent plus a provincial tax of 14 percent).  
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2.9 Comparison 
Table 12: the 
cases 
compared 
Different 
tax rates 
per sector 
Main goal tax policy EPZ Special 
policy on 
fixed assets 
Special 
policy on 
training 
of 
empolyees 
and R&D 
DTT 
Botswana Yes 
(secondary 
sector) 
Making  the economy less 
depending on the mining 
industry 
No Yes (only for 
non-mining 
companies) 
No 10  
Zambia Yes (mining 
and 
agricultural 
sector) 
Attracting investments in the 
mining and agricultural sector.  
No* No No 21  
Mozambique Yes (primary 
sector) 
Stimulate investments in 
infrastructure, knowledge and 
the agricultural sector 
No Yes Yes 4  
Kenya No Stimulate investment in the 
manufacturing and hotel 
industry  
Yes Yes (only for 
manufacturing 
companies and 
hotels) 
No 8 
Tanzania No Stimulate investment in 
agricultural, mining, tourism 
and manufacturing companies. 
Yes Yes No 9 
Uganda Yes (for the 
mining 
sector) 
Stimulate investment in the 
mining sector and export 
No Yes Yes 10 
Nigeria No Stimulate export and growth in 
pioneer industries, agriculture, 
agro-processing, mining, 
manufacturing and services. 
No Yes Yes 5 
Ghana Yes 
(Agriculture, 
rural banking, 
leasing and 
hotel) 
Stimulate export and investment 
in the rural/agriculture sector 
and leasing and hotel industry.  
Yes Yes No 6 
* Instead of EPZs Zambia has economic zones that are not extra-territorial but are comparable to EPZs
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The tax regimes of the cases are, not unexpected, as diverse as the continent Africa 
itself (table 12). Yet, there is a similarity between Kenya and Tanzania. The both  have 
no special taxes for different sectors, they try to stimulate investment in the 
manufacturing and tourist industries, have both EPZs and special policy on fixed assets. 
The explanation of this similarity could be that the two countries are working together 
in the East African Community and  have the ambition to have a common market in 
2010 and a monetary union by 2012 (EAC, 2009). Uganda is a member state of the East 
African Community too, but the tax regime of Uganda has no obvious similarities with 
Kenya and Tanzania. The tax regime of Uganda will probably move more towards the 
tax regime of Kenya and Tanzania as the integration of the East African countries 
continues.   
Next to the similarity between the Kenyan and Tanzanian tax regimes the tax regimes of 
Mozambique, Ghana and Zambia are striking. The similarity between Mozambique and 
Zambia could be the result of the membership of the SADC (Southern African 
Development Community).The Mozambican government stimulates investment in 
(public) infrastructure by the private sector with deductions. This policy is used by the 
Zambian government too, but only in MFEZs.  
The Ghanaian government stimulates investment in the rural areas of Ghana with 
special corporate tax rates for rural banking. Thus next to direct incentives for the 
agricultural sector the Ghanaian government stimulates rural banking to provided 
capital in the rural areas and to promote rural development.  
The Zambian government has signed a total of 21 DTTs. The totals of 21 DTTs are a lot 
compared with the other countries. That are even more treaties than Nigeria, Ghana and 
Uganda altogether.  
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Chapter 3: Foreign investment and the impact of corporate tax rate changes 
In the following chapter the foreign investment in the eight cases will be described. First 
total foreign investment and the growth of the total foreign investment will be described. 
This information will outline remarkable changes in the foreign investment flows. Then 
the corporate tax rates between 1995-2002 will be compared with the total foreign 
investment in the same period. This will show how companies react on changes of the 
corporate tax rate.    
 
3.1The impact of the corporate tax rate on foreign investment in Botswana 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2008, World Tax Database 2009 
 
Botswana emerged from a least developed country (LDC) status within one generation 
to a middle-income country. Foreign direct investment was a driving force in this 
dramatic change (UNCTAD, 2003). Because Botswana has a large diamond reserve it 
has a high potential to attract foreign investors.  
 
Table 13 shows a fast growth in foreign investment after 2000. Before 2000 the total 
foreign direct investment peaked at 95,3 million dollar in 1998. Four years later in 2002 
the total foreign direct investment was 405 million dollar, a growth of 325 percent. In 
2003 the total foreign direct investment declined to 86 million dollars, probably because 
of a government cut in economic development projects. Between 2004 and the 2007 the 
total foreign direct investment was significant better than before 2002. The annual 
average total foreign direct investment between 2002 and 2007 is 357 million dollar, the 
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annual average between 1995 and 2001 is 42 million dollar. Thus the total foreign direct 
investment grew significantly after 2001.  
 
The tax regime of Botswana has no significant change since 1999, when the Income 
Tax Act became effective (Botswana IFSC, 2005).The growth of total foreign 
investment seemed to be quite random between 1995 and 2001 but after 2001 the total 
foreign investment grew explosive, while the corporate tax rate remained 25 percent 
(Graph 5). Thus there is no obvious relation between the corporate tax rate and the total 
foreign direct investment.  
 
3.2 The impact of the corporate tax rate on foreign investment in Zambia 
Zambia’s economy largely depends on the mining of copper. Because of the high 
copper prices the recent years, the real GDP could grow in 2005-2008 about 6 percent 
per year. The government-owned copper mines were privatized in the 1990s (CIA, 
2009). 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2008, World Tax Database 2009 
 
Table 14 shows the impressive growth of the total foreign direct investment in million 
dollars after 2003. The average total foreign direct investment between 1995 and 2003 
is circa 121 million dollar. The average total foreign direct investment between 2004 
and 2008 is circa 660 million dollar. The growth peaked 2007 in 2008 the total foreign 
direct investment declined to a, compared to the other cases, still impressive 939 million 
dollar. A possible reason is the global food crisis of 2008.  
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In 2006 the tax regime got a new list of incentives (UNCTAD, 2006). Because the 
foreign investment grew after 2006, the new incentives had a positive effect on the total 
foreign direct investment. Probably other factors were important as well. Graph 6 shows 
that the total foreign investment grew until 1997 after which the total foreign investment 
decreased. The corporate tax rate remained the same rate, thus the corporate tax rate 
does not seem to affect the total foreign investment.   
 
3.3 The impact of the corporate tax rate on foreign investment in Mozambique 
Mozambique has long suffered from a civil war (1977-1992) and mismanagement. 
Therefore Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world. Since 1994 there 
are multiparty elections, and the government has worked on several macroeconomic 
reforms.  The country’s largest foreign investment is a new build aluminium smelter in 
Maputo (CIA, 2009).  
 
Source: UNCTAD 2008, World Tax Database 2009 
 
The growth of the total foreign direct investment is quite random in Mozambique. After 
2005 the growth of total foreign direct investment skyrockets with an average annual 
growth percentage of 85 percent. But the total foreign direct investment in Mozambique 
has had also a period of fast growth between 1997 and 1999. There was of decline in the 
total foreign direct investment in 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2005. Although the growth in 
recent years is promising, the total foreign investment in Mozambique is far from 
steady,. 
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Mozambique has reformed its tax regime in 2003, which has replaced the corporate tax 
and strengthen the tax administration by improving collection procedures and increasing 
enforcement capacity (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2009). After the tax reform in 2003 
the total foreign direct investment declined in 2004 and grew after 2005. Thus there is 
no obvious relation between the tax regime reform and the total foreign direct 
investment. In 1999 the Mozambican government decreased the corporate tax rate from 
45 percent to 35 percent (Graph 7). This decrease of ten percent resulted in a even lower 
total foreign investment. Thus there is not an obvious relation between the corporate tax 
rate on the total foreign direct investment.  
 
3.4 The impact of the corporate tax rate on foreign investment in Kenya 
Although Kenya is considered as the regional hub for trade and finance it suffers from 
corruption and mismanagement. Several times has the IMF resumed loans to Kenya, 
after repeatedly stopping their loans for various reason related to corruption. In 2001 the 
IMF ended the loans because the Kenyan government could not institute several 
anticorruption measurements. After some early progress in rooting out corruption and 
encouraging donor support, the government was rocked by high-level graft scandals in 
2005 and 2006.The unstable politics led to riots after the 2007 elections. These riots and 
the economic crisis reduced the growth of the GDP from 7 percent in 2007 to 2,2% in 
2008 (CIA, 2009).   
 
Source: UNCTAD 2008, World Tax Database 2009 
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The total foreign direct investment in Kenya balances between the 0 and 120 million 
dollar. Kenya has a few peaks in 1997, 2000 and 2003 but corruption scandals such as 
the 2005 corruption scandal have a very negative impact on the total foreign direct 
investment. Only in 2007 the total foreign direct investment sky rocketed towards 738 
million dollar. This is not a trend because the next year, in 2008, the total foreign direct 
investment was again between the 0 and 120 million dollar. (Table 16).  
 
The Kenyan tax regime is in force since 1995. In 2004/2005 the Kenyan Revenue 
Authority reformed the tax regime. In 2008/2009 the second  phase of this reform will 
proceed. After the reforms in 2004/2005 the total foreign investment increased in 2006 
and 2007 (KRA, 2006). Thus I can assume that these reforms were positive, although 
other variables could affect the foreign investment too.  Graph 8 shows a quite random 
total foreign investment growth in Kenya between 1995 and 2002, and a decreasing 
corporate tax rate. Thus it seems that there is no relation between the corporate tax rate 
and total foreign investment.  
 
3.5 The impact of the corporate tax rate on foreign investment in Tanzania 
Tanzania depends strongly on the agricultural sector, though only 4 percent of the land 
area is suitable for cultivating crops. Since 2005 the industrial sector is getting more 
important and increases the export of minerals, led by gold. Recent banking reforms 
have helped increase private sector growth and investment. This solid macroeconomic 
policies has paid off with a GDP growth of 7,1 percent in 2008 (CIA, 2009). 
 
Source: UNCTAD 2008, World Tax Database 2009 
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The total foreign direct investment growth in Tanzania is quite stable, with only in 1999 
an big exception. Between 1995 and 2008 the total foreign direct investment in 
Tanzania grew with 396 percent. In a relative short time, 13 years, the total foreign 
direct investment in Tanzania quadrupled. Graph 9 shows from 2004 almost a straight 
line, what means that there is a stable growth of total foreign direct investment in 
Tanzania. 
The current tax regime is in force since 2004 with limited changes since then. Table 17 
shows a growth of the foreign investment in Tanzania. Since 2004 there is a stable 
growth of the total foreign direct investment thus the tax regime change was positive. 
The decrease of the corporate tax rate in 1998 resulted in a massive growth of foreign 
direct investment. Thus I can assume that the change of the corporate tax rate was 
positive, but other variables could affect the growth in foreign investment too.  
 
3.6 The impact of the corporate tax rate on foreign investment in Uganda 
Uganda has several natural resources including copper, cobalt and gold. But agriculture 
is the most import sector of the economy, employing over 80 percent of the work force 
and coffee is the main export product. Since the 1990s the economy has a steady growth, 
through incentives for production and exports, reduced inflation, gradually improved 
domestic security, and  the return of exiled Indian-Ugandan entrepreneurs (CIA, 2009).  
Source: UNCTAD 2008, World Tax Database 2009 
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The total foreign direct investment in Uganda started from a very low level in 1995. In 
1996 the total foreign direct investment shrunk to 400.000 dollar. After 1996 there is a 
steady growth of the total foreign direct investment. Between 1999 and 2004 the total 
foreign direct investment stayed between the 200 and 300 million dollar. After 2004 the 
growth of the total foreign direct investment accelerated. In 2008 the total foreign direct 
investment  was 787 million dollar. The total foreign direct investment grew from 1995 
with 6458 percent (!).  
 
The Uganda tax regime is in force since 1998 with changes made in 2008.  Since the 
reform of the tax regime in the 1998 the foreign investment in Uganda increased. Thus, 
I can assume the change of tax regime was positive. Probably other factors influenced 
the growth in foreign investment too. The corporate tax rate did not change between 
1995 and 2008 while the total foreign direct investment grew from almost nothing in 
1995 (12 million dollar) towards 787 million dollar in 2008. We can assume that there is 
no relation between the corporate tax rate and the total foreign direct investment.  
 
3.7 The impact of the corporate tax rate on foreign investment in Nigeria 
Nigeria’s large oil reserves have boosted the economy the last years. Nigeria is depends 
strongly on oil exports, the budgetary revenues are for 80 percent provided by oil 
earnings. Although the elections of 2007 were troubled by violence and irregularities it 
also marked the first civilian-to-civilian transfer in the country (CIA, 2009).   
 
Source: UNCTAD 2008, World Tax Database 2009 
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Table 19 shows that Nigeria has, compared with the other cases, a very high level of 
foreign investment. Between 1995 and 2003 the total foreign direct investment balanced 
between the 500 and 1300 million dollar. After 2003 the total foreign direct investment 
grew fast. In 2005 and 2006 the foreign investment increased with 134,04 percent and 
180,35 percent, probably due the high oil prices. In 2007 there were casualties around 
the elections what could have affected the 10,11 percent decrease of the total foreign 
investment. In 2008 the total foreign direct investment was 202.800 million dollar. The 
total foreign direct investment grew between 1995 and 2008 with 3396,6 percent. 
Since 1995 the tax regime of Nigeria is in force. Because the total foreign investment 
since then rose, we can assume the change was positive. Probably other factors 
influenced the growth in foreign investment too. The corporate tax rate of Nigeria was 
reduced in 1995, the total foreign investment reacted positively on this reduction  
(Graph 11).  
 
3.8 The impact of the corporate tax rate on foreign investment in Ghana 
Ghana is well endowed with natural resources including gold, oil and diamonds. The 
domestic economy is dominated by the agricultural sector, especially the cacao 
production (CIA, 2009).  
 
Source: UNCTAD 2008, World Tax Database 2009 
 
Table 20 shows a steady growth of the total foreign investment from the 1995 until 
2005. The total foreign direct investment balances between the 60 million dollar and the 
150 million dollar. After 2005 the growth of the total foreign direct investment sky 
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rockets. First grew the total foreign direct investment with 338,62 percent to 636 million 
dollar in 2006. Thereafter the total foreign investment increased even more to 855 
million dollar in 2007. In 2008 the total foreign direct investment increased again 
explosive towards 2120 million dollar, an increase of 148 percent.  
The tax regime of Ghana is in force since 2000, with amendments in every year since 
2002. Because Ghana has shown every year an increase in total foreign investment we 
can assume that these changes had a positive effect. Probably other factors influenced 
the growth in foreign investment too. The corporate tax rate decreased from 2002 until 
2006. Every time the corporate tax rate decreases, the total foreign direct investment 
increases. This suggests that there is a relation between the corporate tax rate and the 
total foreign direct investment.  
 
2.9 The relation between foreign investment and the corporate tax regime  
In the following paragraph the characteristics of the corporate tax regimes of the eight 
cases (table 12) will be compared with total foreign investment as a percentage of the 
total GDP. Because the corporate tax rates varies between sectors I will use the highest 
standard tax rate. For Botswana the corporate tax rate is set on 25 percent, a sum of the 
corporate tax rate and the additional company tax. Table 21 shows that the total foreign 
investment is more important for some countries than other. Especially Zambia and 
Nigeria profit from foreign investment.  
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Table 21: Coporate tax 
rates, FDI and GDP 
Corporate 
tax rate 
Total foreign 
investment in 
million dollars GDP 
Total 
foreign 
investment 
as a 
percentage 
of the GDP 
Botswana  25 495 13810 3,58 
Zambia  35 984 15230 6,46 
Mozambique  32 427 9788 4,36 
Kenya  37,5 728 31142 2,34 
Tanzania  30 600 20630 2,91 
Uganda  30 368 15040 2,45 
Nigeria  32 12545 220300 5,69 
Ghana  25 855 17720 4,83 
 
Table 22 shows no significant correlations between the total foreign investment as a 
percentage of the GDP and the characteristics of the tax regime, but gives insights 
which characteristics of a tax regime are important in attracting FDI: 
• There is a positive correlation between the number of DTTs and the total foreign 
investment as a percentage of the GDP. Thus, DTTs have a positive impact on 
FDI. 
• There is a negative correlation between EPZs and the total foreign investment as 
a percentage of the GDP. Thus, EPZs do not provided more FDI flows towards a 
country.  
• There is a strong negative correlation (with a significance of 0,092) between 
special policy on fixed assets and the total investment as a percentage of the 
GDP. Thus, special policy on fixed assets is not recommend when a country 
wants to attract more FDI. 
• There is no correlation between special policy on employees and R&D. Thus 
special policy on employees and R&D have no negative or positive influence on 
attracting FDI.  
• There is a positive correlation between different tax rates and the total foreign 
investment as a percentage of the GDP. Thus different tax rates attracts foreign 
investors. 
• There is no correlation between the corporate tax rates and the total foreign 
investment as a percentage of the GDP.  
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Table 22: correlations between characteristics of the tax regime and 
The total foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP 
 
Total foreign 
investment as a 
percentage of 
the GDP  
Pearson Correlation ,320
Sig. (2-tailed) ,439
Number of DTTs 
N 8
Pearson Correlation -,391
Sig. (2-tailed) ,339
EPZ 0=No 1=Yes 
N 8
Pearson Correlation -,633
Sig. (2-tailed) ,092
Special policy on fixed assets 
0=No 1=Yes 
N 8
Pearson Correlation ,049
Sig. (2-tailed) ,909
Special policy on training of 
employees and R&D 0=No 
1=Yes 
N 8
Pearson Correlation ,235
Sig. (2-tailed) ,576
Different tax rates per sector 
0=No 1=Yes 
N 8
Pearson Correlation ,030
Sig. (2-tailed) ,944
Corporate tax rate 
N 8
 
When a tax regime is designed for attracting FDI it should be a tax regime with many 
DTTs, no EPZs,  no special policy on fixed assets and different tax rates per sector. 
Special policy on the training of employees and R&D are additional.  
Because there is no correlation between the corporate tax rate and the total foreign 
investment as a percentage of the GDP I can concluded the height of the corporate tax 
rate is not important for investors. This suggests that a tax competition between the 
emerging economies of Africa is avoidable. The feared so-called race to the bottom is 
not applicable for foreign investors in emerging economies of Africa. This could be 
explained because the economies are specialized, and especially the countries with a lot 
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of natural resources, to compete which each other. When a foreign investor wants to 
invest, for example, in the wining of copper, he has to invest in Zambia because it is 
impossible the win copper in Mozambique.  
 
3.10 Conclusion 
We can concluded four things. First, tax regime reforms in the recent years have never 
affected the foreign investment in the eight cases negatively. After a tax regime reform 
the foreign investment increased in all the cases. This does not mean that there are no 
other factors that are important in the increase of foreign investment, but investors 
neither stopped their activities in the countries.  
Second, there is no evidence that investors are attracted to lower corporate tax rates. In 
five cases the corporate tax rates was reduced. In two cases, Tanzania and Ghana, 
investors reacted positively on the reduction of the corporate tax rate. In one case, 
Kenya, the investors reacted on the first reduction of the corporate tax rate positively, 
but on the second reduction of the corporate tax rate negatively. And in the two last 
cases, Mozambique and Nigeria reacted the investors negatively on the reduction of the 
corporate tax rate. In short, the reaction of investors on corporate tax rate reductions is 
quite random.  
Third, there is no correlation between the height of the corporate tax rates and the total 
foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP. Thus it seems that the tax regime does 
not affect foreign investment and that other factors are more important.  
Fourth, a tax regime with many DTTs, no EPZs,  no special policy on fixed assets and 
different tax rates per sector is more likely to attract FDI than other tax regimes. Zambia 
is the only country that has this characteristics. Notably, Zambia has the highest 
percentage of total foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP and the highest 
number of DTTs. Also, Zambia is the only country without special policy on fixed 
assets, but still has the second place in attracting foreign investment in fixed assets 
(chapter 4). This is probably because of the important copper industry in Zambia, which 
needs investment in fixed assets. Investors do not like procedures (chapter 5) and that is 
probably why special policy on fixed assets, including a range of incentives, deductions 
and tax allowances are not considered as positive. The less procedures and rules the 
better.  
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Chapter 4: The trust of investors 
 
Whether a investor invests in a country depends on a lot of factors. But I assume that 
when a investor invests in a project he trusts that his investment will be profitable. Sub-
Sahara Africa is perceived as overly risky and therefore a country in the region will 
receive less FDI by virtue of its geographical location (Asiedu, 2002). Therefore I will 
investigated how much trust foreign investors have in the eight emerging economies of 
sub-Sahara Africa. I use three indictors to measure if a country is trustworthiness for 
foreign investors. The first indicators are the insurance ceilings  (short and long term 
investment), the second indicator is the Investor Protection Index and the third indicator 
is the foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation.  
First the insurance ceilings for short term and long term investments of the eight cases 
will be compared. Next there will be explored if there is a correlation between the total 
foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP and the insurance ceilings.  
Second the Investor Protection Indexes of the eight cases will be compared. Thereafter 
there will be explored whether there is a correlation between the total foreign 
investment as a percentage of GDP and the Investor Protection Index. The Investor 
Protection Indexes of the eight cases will be compared with the OECD and sub-Sahara 
Africa.  
Third the foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation. The 
foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation is an commonly 
used indictor for long term activity in a country.  The total foreign investment as a 
percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation  will be compared with the total foreign 
investment as a percentage of the GDP.  
 
4.1 Insurance ceilings 
The insurance company Ducroire Delcredere can cover export transactions financed by 
both short-term credits and medium/long term credits against political and commercial 
risks on open account terms, i.e. without a bank guarantee being required.  In 
conformity with the OECD Arrangement, the maximum  reimbursement period for 
medium- and long-term transactions with this country has been set at 10 years. Ducroire 
Delcredere insures investments in this country against, war risk, the risk of 
expropriation and government action and the transfer risk regarding payment of 
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dividends or repatriation of capital. Each application is decided case by case on the 
basis of a detailed analysis (Ducroire Delcredere, 2009).  
 
Table 23: Insurance ceilings 
Insurance 
ceilings 
short 
term 
In 
millions 
Insurance 
ceilings 
long term 
in 
millions 
Total 
foreign 
investement 
as a 
percentage 
of the GDP  Rank 
Botswana  170  475  3,58 5 
Zambia  150  325  6,46 1 
Mozambique  70  220  4,36 4 
Kenya  275  725  2,34 8 
Tanzania  140  350  2,91 6 
Uganda  110  220  2,45 7 
Nigeria  1500  750  5,69 2 
Ghana  250  625  4,83 3 
Average  333,125  461,25  4,08 ‐ 
Germany  2250  2250  ‐  ‐ 
United States  2250  2250  ‐  ‐ 
South‐Africa  1500  1500  ‐  ‐ 
Ducroir Delcredere, 2009/UNCTAD, 2008 
 
Table 23 shows the insurance ceilings for short term investment and the insurance 
ceilings for long term investments. Striking is that the short term insurance ceiling for 
Nigeria is higher than the long term ceiling. This assumes that  Ducroir Delcredere have 
less trust in long term investments than in short term investments. All the other cases 
have a lower short term ceiling.  
When the average short term insurance ceiling and the average long term insurance 
ceiling of the eight cases are compared with OECD-members Germany and the United 
States and the economic motor of Africa, South-Africa, the ceilings are very low. 
Probably the risky reputation that Asiedu already addressed affect the eight cases too. It 
is remarkable that the short and long term insurance ceilings from Germany, the United 
States and South-Africa are the same, while the short and long term insurance ceilings 
differ for the eight cases. This could also be the result of the risky reputation of sub-
Sahara Africa. 
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Total foreign 
investment as a 
percentage of 
the GDP  
Pearson Correlation ,410
Sig. (2-tailed) ,313
Insurance ceilings short term 
N 8
Pearson Correlation ,110
Sig. (2-tailed) ,795
Insurance ceilings long term 
N 8
 
Table 24 shows the correlations between the insurance possibilities and the total foreign 
investment.  There is no significant correlation between the total foreign investment as a 
percentage of the GDP  and neither the short term nor long term  insurance possibilities. 
But the correlation between the total foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP  
and the short term insurance possibilities is stronger than the correlation between the 
total foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP and the long term insurance 
possibilities.  
This suggest that insurance companies trust long term investments less than short term 
investments. This seems expectable, because the longer a project takes the more risks 
there are. But OECD countries such as the United States and Germany and the 
economic motor of Africa, South-Africa, have all the same ceilings for short term 
investments and long term investments (Doing Business, 2009). It could be that 
insurance companies have less trust in long term investments than in short term 
investments in the eight cases, still the long term insurance ceilings are in seven cases 
higher than the short term insurance ceilings.  
 
4.2 Investor Protection Index 
The Investor Protection Index measures the strength of minority shareholders against 
directors misuse of corporate assets for personal gain (Djankov et al., 2008). The index 
is from a range of 0-10, and based on a survey under corporate lawyers.  
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Table 25: Investor 
Protection Index 
Investor 
Protection 
Index 
Total 
foreign 
investment
Rank Total 
foreign 
investment
Botswana  4.3 495 6
Zambia  5.3 984 2
Mozambique  6,0 427 7
Kenya  5,0 728 4
Tanzania  5,0 600 5
Uganda  4,0 368 8
Nigeria  5.7 12545 1
Ghana  6,0 855 3
Average  5,20 2125,25 ‐
OECD  5.8 ‐ ‐
Sub‐Sahara Africa  4.3 ‐ ‐
Doing Business 2009 
 
Table 25 shows that the average score on the Investor Protection Index of the eight 
cases is 5,2.  Compared with the score of the OECD (5,8), the average of the eight cases 
is relatively good. Mozambique and Ghana have both a Investor Protection Index of 6, 
higher than the members of the OECD. This means that the protection of investors can 
be considered as good in Mozambique and Ghana. Mozambique has the seventh place 
in the ranking o total foreign investment, Ghana the third. The other countries have a 
lower score on the Investor Protection Index, although Nigeria is very close to the 
OECD countries with a score of 5.7. Nigeria is the country that attracts the most foreign 
investment. Compared with the average score of sub-Sahara Africa(4,3) only Uganda 
scores less (4,0), notably Uganda attracts the least foreign investment too.  
 
Table 26: Correlation between total foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP and Investor 
Protection Index 
 
 
Total foreign 
investment as a 
percentage of 
the GDP  
Pearson Correlation ,614
Sig. (2-tailed) ,105
Investor protection index 
N 8
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Table 26 shows the correlation between total foreign investment as a percentage of the 
GDP and the Investor Protection Index. There is no significant correlation, although 
there is a positive relation between the total foreign investment and the Investor 
Protection Index. This means that how saver the investment is, the more a country can 
attract investment. 
 
4.3 Foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation  
The total foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation  shows 
how much foreign investors invest in fixed assets. Investment in fixed assets suggests 
long term activity in a country. Table 27 shows the total foreign investment as a 
percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation  in 1990-2000 and 2005,2006 and 2007 of 
the eight cases plus OECD members and two of the biggest economies in the world 
Germany and the United States  and the economic motor of Africa, South-Africa.  The 
investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation has grown in all the 
countries since 1990. But the growth was not a steady growth. In 2005 five of the eight 
cases had a lower total foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation percentage than the annual average of 1990-2000. This could be because the 
oil prices roses sharply because the hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf of Mexico. This could 
explain the high investment in fixed assets in Nigeria of 2006 too. Probably oil 
producents expanded their investments in the oil fields in Nigeria because of the 
problems in the Gulf of Mexico. 
The very low total foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
in 2005 and 2006 of Kenya could be explained by the corruption scandals of 2005 and 
2006 in Kenya.  
The average total foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
of the eight cases is over time always higher than in Germany and the United States. 
This could be explained due the lack of fixed assets in the eight cases, while Germany 
and the United States already have a lot of fixed assets.  
Countries that highly depending on the export of natural resources (Chapter 6) are 
Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique and Nigeria. They are the four cases that have the 
highest total foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
percentages too. This could be explained because investors need fixed assets to explore 
natural resources.  
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Table 27: 
Investment as a 
percentage of 
gross fixed capital 
formation  1990‐2000  2005  2006  2007 
Botswana  1,5  14,7 26,9 24,4
Zambia  31,1  19,9 22,8 35,6
Mozambique  13,4  8,5 9,1 22,6
Kenya  1,5  0,6 1,2 13,1
Tanzania  12,4  20 17,7 17,9
Uganda  8,3  17,6 15,8 12,3
Nigeria  41,8  36,7 88,5 69,6
Ghana  8,6  4,6 19,4 22,3
Average  14,825  15,325 25,175 27,225
Germany  6,9  8,6 10,5 8,3
United States  7  4,3 9,1 9
South‐Africa  4,1  16,1 ‐1,2 11,5
 
 
Table 28 shows a significant correlation between the total foreign investment as a 
percentage of the GDP and the total foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed 
Capital. Though the total foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation and the share of natural resources in total export correlate too. 
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Table 28: Correlations between the Total foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP, the Total 
foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation and the share of natural 
resources in the Total export 
 As a percentage 
of gross fixed 
capital formation
Total foreign 
investment as a 
percentage of 
the GDP  
Share of natural 
resources in total 
export 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,728* ,748*
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,041 ,033
As a percentage of gross 
fixed capital formation 
N 8 8 8
Pearson Correlation ,728* 1 ,683
Sig. (2-tailed) ,041  ,062
Total foreign investment as a 
percentage of the GDP  
N 8 8 8
Pearson Correlation ,748* ,683 1
Sig. (2-tailed) ,033 ,062  
Share of natural resources in 
total export 
N 8 8 8
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
4.4 The trust of investors 
The only significant correlation I found was between the total foreign investment as a 
percentage of the GDP and the foreign investment as a percentage of Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation. Therefore I can assume that investors have more trust in countries 
where other investors have invested in fixed assets, and thus have probably a long term 
strategy for this country. Though this correlation is influenced by the share of natural 
resources in the total export of a country. I assume that investors want to take more risks 
when they invest in a country with a high share of natural resources in the total export 
then in a country with less profitable and more footloose export goods.   
Other indicators of the trust of investors play a less important role neither the investor 
protection index nor the insurance ceilings have significant correlations with the total 
foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP. This assumes that investors mainly 
follow fellow investors when the invest in one of the eight cases.  The risky reputation 
of sub-Sahara Africa probably results in lower insurance ceilings (for short and long 
term). The average investor protection index of the eight cases is better than the average 
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of the region and comparable with the score of OECD members. It seems that the risky 
reputation of sub-Sahara Africa affects FDI flows towards the eight cases too.  
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Chapter 5: The functioning of the government 
 
In which way affects the functioning of the government the foreign investment in a 
country? To explore the effect of the functioning of the government on the foreign 
investment I use four  indicators. The number of days it takes to start a business, the 
number of procedures it takes to start a business, the number of days it takes to enforce 
a contract, and the corruption perception index.  
 
5.1 Starting a business 
The number of days and the number of procedures it takes to start a business are 
surveyed by Doing Business in 2009.  It takes the most days to start a business in 
Botswana, almost one third of a year. Compared with the average of the eight cases and  
sub-Sahara Africa this is very high. The duration of starting a business in Botswana is 
eight times (!) the duration of starting a business in a OECD country.  In Mozambique 
and Tanzania starting a business goes quite quickly compared with the average of the 
eight countries and sub-Sahara Africa, it still goes faster in a OECD country (Table 29).  
Table 29: Starting a 
business  Number of days  Number of procedures 
Botswana  108 11
Zambia  33 6
Mozambique  29 10
Kenya  44 12
Tanzania  29 12
Uganda  28 18
Nigeria  34 9
Ghana  42 11
Average  43,375 11,125
OECD  13,4 5,8
sub‐Sahara Africa  47,8 10,2
 
Table 30 shows that starting a business (number of days) and starting a business 
(number of procedures) correlate both negatively with total foreign investment. The 
number of procedures it takes to start a business correlates significantly with the total 
foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP, the correlation between the total foreign 
investment as a percentage of the GDP and the number of days it takes to start a 
business correlates less.   
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Table 30: correlations between total foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP and starting a 
business 
 
 
Total foreign 
investment as a 
percentage of 
the GDP  
Pearson Correlation -,127
Sig. (1-tailed) ,382
Starting a business (number 
of days) 
N 8
Pearson Correlation -,821**
Sig. (1-tailed) ,006
Starting a business (number 
of procedures) 
N 8
 
5.2 Enforcing a contract 
The number of days it takes to enforce a contract is surveyed by Doing Business in 2009. 
The average for the cases is 609,25 days. Especially in Botswana (987 days) and 
Mozambique (1010 days) it takes a long time before a contract is in force. In Uganda it 
takes 535 days, and all the other countries are comparable with the score of the OECD 
countries (462,7 days). This is quite an achievement, especially compared with the 
average for sub-Sahara Africa, which is 1052,9 days (Table 31).  
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Table 31: Enforcing a 
contract   Number of days: 
Botswana  987
Zambia  471
Mozambique  1010
Kenya  465
Tanzania  462
Uganda  535
Nigeria  457
Ghana  487
Average  609,25
OECD  462,70
sub‐Sahara Africa  1052,90
 
Table 32 shows that there is almost no correlation between the total foreign investment 
as a percentage of the GDP and the number of days it takes to enforce a contract.  
table 32: correlation between enforcing a contract and total foreign investment as a percentage of 
the total foreign investment 
 
 
Total foreign 
investment as a 
percentage of 
the GDP  
Pearson Correlation -,077
Sig. (1-tailed) ,428
Enforcing a contract (number 
of days) 
N 8
 
 5.3 Corruption 
The corruption perception index (CPI index) is provided by Transparency International 
with a range from 0 to 10. This NGO maps corruption all over the world. If the CPI 
index is lower than 3, Transparency International considers that as rampant. A score 
between the 3 and 5 is a serious challenge for the government. There are only three 
countries in sub-Sahara Africa that score above the mid-point of 5, that are Mauritius, 
Cape Verde and Botswana (Transparency International, 2008).  
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Table 33: CPI index CPI 
Botswana  5,8
Zambia  2,8
Mozambique  2,6
Kenya  2,1
Tanzania  3
Uganda  2,6
Nigeria  2,7
Ghana  3,9
Average  3,1875
Germany  7,9
United States  7,3
South‐Africa  4,9
Source: Transparency International, 2008 
Table 33 shows that only three countries score above the 3, that are the already 
mentioned Botswana, Tanzania and Ghana. The other countries, Zambia, Mozambique, 
Kenya, Uganda and Nigeria score below the 3 points, and thus are very corrupt. 
Tanzania and Ghana score between the 3 and  5 and thus have a serious challenge to 
handle the corruption. Though Botswana has a high score for the region of 5,8, on a 
scale from 0 to 10 it’s not that impressive.  
Compared with the OECD-members, Germany (7,9) and the United States (7,3) the 
average of the eight cases (3,2)  is very low. South-Africa (4,9), the economic motor of 
Africa, scores also better.  
Table 34: correlation between total foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP and the CPI 
index 
 
 
Total foreign 
investment as a 
percentage of 
the GDP  
Pearson Correlation 1
Sig. (1-tailed)  
Total foreign investment as a 
percentage of the GDP  
N 8
Pearson Correlation ,034
Sig. (1-tailed) ,468
CPI index 
N 8
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Table 34 shows that the correlation between total foreign investment as a percentage of 
the GDP and the CPI index is insignificant. Thus there is no relation between the level 
of corruption and the total foreign investment.  
  
5.4 Conclusion 
The significant correlation between total foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP 
and the number of procedures it takes to start a business suggest that much procedures 
does not attract investors. Maybe that is why there is no correlation between the CPI 
index and the total foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP. When the corruption 
is common, it is easier to bribe government officials and to avoid procedures. The other 
indicators did not have strong correlations with the total foreign investment as a 
percentage of the GDP.  
Table 35 is a overview of the score of the eight cases per  indicator. The country that 
score the best on a indicator gets a green colour. The country that scores the worst gets a 
red colour. No country scores best on all the indicators. Remarkable is that Botswana 
scores best on the CPI but the worst on the number of days it takes to start a business. 
Uganda has a best and worst score too. Uganda scores the best on the number of days it 
takes to start a business but the worst on the number of procedures in takes to start a 
business. That seems strange because I expected that the less procedures have to be 
completed, the faster a business can start.  
Only Ghana scores on all the four indicators better than the average, yet has never a best 
score. None of the countries scores exquisite. 
Table 35: Functioning of the 
government 
Starting a 
business 
(number of 
days) 
Starting a 
business 
(number of 
procedures)
Enforcing a 
contract  CPI 
Botswana  108 11 987 5,8 
Zambia  33 6 471 2,8 
Mozambique  29 10 1010 2,6 
Kenya  44 12 465 2,1 
Tanzania  29 12 462 3 
Uganda  28 18 535 2,6 
Nigeria  34 9 457 2,7 
Ghana  42 11 487 3,9 
Average  43,375 11,125 609,25 3,1875 
OECD  13,4 5,8 462,70  ‐ 
sub‐Sahara Africa  47,8 10,2 1052,90  ‐ 
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Chapter 6: Other variables 
 
In this chapter we will do a quick scan whether three other variables affect foreign 
investment in the eight cases. This variables are: the infrastructure, the share of minerals 
in the total export and the level of rigidity of employment.  
The infrastructure has as  indicator the total airports with paved runways per 100.000 
inhabitants. The data is found in the CIA world fact book. I assume that a investors will 
sooner invested in a country with  much infrastructure than in a country with less 
infrastructure.  
The share of minerals in the export data will be provided by the International Trade 
Centre. I assume that a country with a high share of minerals in the export attracts more 
foreign investors. 
The Doing Business survey contains a rigidity of employment index. A high rigidity 
means that there are many regulations that protect employees I assume that the lesser 
the rigidity of employment the more foreign investment in a country.  
 
6.1 Infrastructure  
The indicator of infrastructure is the total airports per 100.000 inhabitants. The eight 
cases will be compared with Germany, the United States and South-Africa. Germany 
and the United States are two of the biggest economic powers in the world, while south-
Africa is considered as the economic motor of Africa.  
Table 35 shows that the average of the eight cases is 0.04 airports with paved runways 
per 100.000 inhabitants. This is, compared with Germany, the United States and South-
Africa, not much. Only Botswana (0,55) comes near Germany (0,67). Probably 
Botswana scores high because of the small population. Especially Nigeria, but Uganda 
and Tanzania too, have a very low score.  
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Table 36: 
Infrastructure  Airports  Population 
Airports per 
100.000 
people 
Botswana  11  1.990.876 0,55
Zambia  9  11.862.740 0,08
Mozambique  22  21.669.278 0,10
Kenya  36  39.002.772 0,09
Tanzania  10  41.048.532 0,02
Uganda  5  32.269.558 0,02
Nigeria  15  149.229.090 0,01
Ghana  12  23.832.495 0,05
Average  15  40.113.168 0,04
Germany  549  82.329.758 0,67
United States  5146  307.212.123 1,68
South‐Africa  636  49.052.489 1,30
  
Table 37 shows a weak negative correlation between the airports with paved runway per 
100.00 inhabitants and the total foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP. This 
means that the less airports with paved runways per 100.000 inhabitants there are, the 
more foreign investment a country attracts. Thus, I can assume that foreign investors do 
not consider infrastructure as an important indicator for investment in a country.  
Table 37: correlation between total foreign investment and airports with paved 
runways per 100.000 inhabitants 
 
Total foreign 
investment as a 
percentage of 
the GDP  
Pearson Correlation -,112
Sig. (1-tailed) ,396
Number of aiports per 
100.000 inhabitants 
N 8
 
 6.2 Share of natural resources in the total export 
Table 38 shows the total share minerals in the total export of the eight cases and 
Germany, the United States and South-Africa. Germany and the United States are 
OECD-members and two of the biggest economic powers in the world, while south-
Africa is considered as the economic motor of Africa. 
Especially Botswana (88,2%) and Nigeria (98%) are highly depending on natural 
resources for their export. But countries such as Zambia (73,2% and Mozambique 
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(73,7%) are depending largely on the export of natural resources too. The average of the 
eight cases is 54,18 percent. Thus, the eight cases are highly depending on natural 
resources for their export. Compared with the OECD-members Germany (5%) and the 
United States (7,6%) all the eight cases are highly depending on the export of natural 
resources. South-Africa (46,2%) depends less than the average of the eight cases on the 
export of natural resources, but still depends also highly on the export of natural 
resources.  
 
Table 38: 
Share of 
minerals in 
total export 
Share of minerals in 
total export 
Botswana  88,2
Zambia  73,2
Mozambique  73,7
Kenya  10,4
Tanzania  37,14
Uganda  19,7
Nigeria  98
Ghana  33,1
Average  54,18
Germany  5
United States  7,6
South‐Africa  46,2
Source: International Finance Centre, 2006 
 
Table 39 shows a strong positive correlation between total foreign investment  as a 
percentage of the GDP and the share of minerals in the total export. Although the 
correlation is not significant, I can assume that countries with a high share of minerals 
in the total export attract more foreign investors.  
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Table 39: Correlation between the Total foreign investment as a percentage of the 
GDP and the share of natural resources in Total export 
 
Total foreign 
investment as a 
percentage of 
the GDP  
Pearson Correlation ,683
Sig. (2-tailed) ,062
Share of natural resources in 
total export 
N 8
 
6.3 Rigidity of employment 
Table 40 shows the rigidity of employment index. The higher the index score the more 
rigid regulations on employment a country has. The four countries with the highest 
scores ,Tanzania (63), Mozambique (49), Ghana (37) and  Zambia (34) ,have all 
considered themselves, on one point in their history, as socialist states. Probably they 
have therefore quite rigid regulations on employment. The score of Uganda (3) and 
Nigeria (7) are both very low. The average of sub-Sahara Africa is 42,3. Only 
Mozambique and Tanzania score higher. The average of the OECD is 31,4 which is 
comparable with the average of the eight cases.  
 
Table 40: Rigidity 
of employment 
index 
Rigidity of 
empolyment 
index 
Botswana  20
Zambia  34
Mozambique  49
Kenya  17
Tanzania  63
Uganda  3
Nigeria  7
Ghana  37
Average  28,75
Sub‐Sahara Africa  42,3
OECD  31,4
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Table 41 shows that the correlation between the total foreign investment as a percentage 
of the GDP and the rigidity of the employment index is insignificant. This suggests that 
the rigidity of the labor market in the eight cases is not important for foreign investors.  
 
Table 41: correlations between Total foreign investment and the rigidity of 
employment index 
 
Total foreign 
investment as a 
percentage of 
the GDP  
Pearson Correlation ,072
Sig. (1-tailed) ,432
The rigidity of employment 
index 
N 8
 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The quick scan of the infrastructure, the share of minerals in the total export and the 
rigidity of employment index did not result in another significant correlation. Foreign 
investors do not consider infrastructure and the rigidity or employment as a important 
indicators for investment. Mineral-exporting countries are more likely to attract foreign 
investors. 
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 Conclusion 
 
There have been few studies on the influence of tax regimes on FDI in developing 
countries, even fewer studies that focus on sub-Sahara Africa. This study has shed some 
light on the relation between FDI and tax regimes in sub-Sahara Africa. Emerging 
economies in sub-Sahara Africa with a tax regime that has no special policy on fixed 
assets and  no EPZs, but have different tax rates per sector and their government have 
signed a lot of DTTs are more likely to attract FDI than other tax regimes. I assume that 
foreign investors want few bureaucratic rules as possible, considering the strong 
negative correlation between the special policy on fixed assets (including incentives, 
deductions and tax allowances) and the total foreign investment as a percentage of the 
GDP and the significant negative correlation between the number of days it takes to 
start a business  and the total foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP.   
The height of the corporate tax rate does not affect foreign investors. Fear for tax 
competition and the so-called race to the bottom of investors is unfounded. An 
explanation could be that the economies of the eight cases, especially considering the 
winning of natural resources, are too specialized to lead to heavy competition. Further 
research in this direction is needed. Furthermore companies can make special 
arrangements about corporate tax rates that are not known by the institutions I have 
consulted in this research. Because it is not in the range of this study to explore this 
arrangements further research in that direction is needed too.  
This research has explored whether the trust of investors, the functioning of the 
government, the infrastructure, the share of natural resources in the total export and the 
rigidity of employment are more important factors to attract FDI than the corporate tax 
rates. Especially the number of procedures it takes to start a business indicator for the 
functioning of the government and the total foreign investment as a percentage of the 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation for the trust of investors are important factors in 
attracting FDI. Sub-Sahara Africa has a risky reputation and this reputation affects 
investment in the eight cases too. 
Table 41 shows that the number of procedures it takes to start a business and the total 
foreign investment as a percentage of the Gross Fixed Capital formation have a R 
Square of 0,777, thus those two indicators can  strongly predict the height of FDI. Table 
42 shows that fewer procedures to start a business has a positive effect on FDI with a 
significance of 0,065. A high percentage of the total foreign investment of the Gross 
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Fixed Capital Formation has a positive effect on FDI too, with a significance of 0,189. 
A high percentage of the total foreign investment as a percentage of the Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation is highly influenced by the share of natural resources in the export. 
 
Table 41: Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,881a ,777 ,688 ,85007
a. Predictors: (Constant), As a percentage of gross fixed capital 
formation, Starting a business (number of procedures) 
 
 
Table 42: Coefficientsa 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 6,210 1,689  3,678 ,014
Starting a business (number 
of procedures) 
-,269 ,114 -,602 -2,353 ,065
1 
As a percentage of gross 
fixed capital formation 
,032 ,021 ,389 1,519 ,189
a. Dependent Variable: Total foreign investment as a percentage of the GDP  
 
Thus a less bureaucratic government and a good reputation in the eyes of investors help 
to attract FDI. 
Summarizing, a tax regime with less rules, different tax rates per sector and a lot of 
DTTs is more capable in attracting FDI than other tax regimes.  A less bureaucratic 
government and  the trust of investors to invest in fixed assets are important to attract 
FDI too. Tax regimes can help to boost FDI in the emerging economies of sub-Sahara 
Africa, but a comprehensive policy is needed. The reputation of sub-Sahara Africa has 
to improve, it has to be clear for investors that sub-Sahara Africa is divers and that sub-
Sahara Africa is not only the DRC but also promising emerging economies such as the 
eight emerging economies investigated in this research. Investing in the emerging 
economies has to be easier for investors, with less procedures and a tax regime with few 
incentives, deductions and tax allowances.   
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